

TAB 11



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] Document Brief to Republican
Candidate for U.S. President

Date: 08/30/2016

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
WF-CI1

Contact: Joe Pientka III, [REDACTED]

Approved By: KEVIN E. CLINESMITH
STRZOK PETER P II

Drafted By: Joe Pientka III

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661

[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-NY-2069860

[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE RAZOR
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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Synopsis: [REDACTED] This communication documents writer's counterintelligence and security briefing to the Republican candidate for U.S. President Donald J. Trump, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and General (retired) Michael Flynn.

Reason: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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1. [REDACTED] Outline of brief given on 08/17/2016

Details:

On August 17, 2016, writer, provided a counterintelligence and security briefing to U.S. Presidential Candidate Donald J. Trump, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, and retired General Michael Flynn. The brief was held at the FBI's New York Field Office in the TS/SCI SCIF conference room (west side) on the 25th floor and was in support of ODNI briefings provided to U.S. Presidential candidates and two of their advisors.

[REDACTED] Writer's brief lasted approximately thirteen minutes, starting at 1555 and ending at 1608. Upon entering the room Trump, Christie and Flynn shook hands with all of the briefers. Trump, Christie and Flynn sat with their backs to the clocks facing the windows while the briefers sat across from them. An ODNI briefer, [REDACTED], initiated the briefing by discussing the history of the briefings and establishing the ground rules regarding the brief, specifically that the briefers would not answer policy related questions and would not discuss any operations. [REDACTED] then introduced writer, who provided the following brief (not verbatim, this is a summary):

(U [REDACTED]) Good afternoon gentlemen and welcome to the FBI's New York Field Office. My name is Joe Pientka and I'm a Supervisory Special Agent of a Foreign Counterintelligence Squad at the FBI's Washington Field Office. Prior to you receiving the classified presentations from the ODNI briefers, I will provide you with a counterintelligence and security brief that will give you a baseline on the methodology used by Foreign Intelligence Services to the detriment of U.S. National Security. In addition, this brief will advise you that if you are not already a target of a Foreign Intelligence Service, due to the fact you are receiving this classified briefing, you will be. Foreign Intelligence Services want information pertaining to political,

[REDACTED]

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economic, energy, technology and military policy/plans of the U.S. This information is extremely valuable to our trusted allies. Putting it plainly, Foreign Intelligence Services look to collect inside information to give their country a competitive advantage over the U.S.

(U [REDACTED]) Before I speak to the methodology on how Foreign Intelligence Services collect this information, I should lay out their presence here in the United States. Foreign Intelligence Services deploy intelligence collectors - known as Intelligence Officers or IOs in one of two ways. The first is through the official diplomatic presence at their embassies, consulates and establishments in the U.S. IOs are deployed using diplomatic cover. As an example, IOs will purport to be an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in fact their real position is an IO. The second method of deploying intelligence operatives to the U.S. is through non-official cover or NOCs. NOCs can be tourists, businessmen, students, whoever that are not affiliated with their government. This is the most difficult to detect as we would need some forehand knowledge regarding who or what to look for.

[REDACTED] Statistically speaking the FBI has approximately [REDACTED] cases on Known or Suspected Russian IOs posted to the US. We also have approximately [REDACTED] cases on Known or Suspected Chinese IOs - almost [REDACTED] of the Russian establishment presence. What is interesting about the two services is how they have different methodology regarding how they will collect intelligence. The Russians are more like us in the traditional sense where they rely on an establishment presence while the Chinese take a more asymmetrical approach.

[REDACTED] Trump asked the following question, "Joe, are the Russians bad? Because they have more numbers are they worse than the Chinese?" Writer responded by saying both countries are bad. The numbers of IOs present in the U.S. is not an indicator of the severity of the threat. Writer reminded Trump the Chinese asymmetrical presence in the U.S.

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could be ten times as large as the symmetrical presence, yet we would not know. In addition, the OCONUS cyber threat posed by 3PLA would also need to be considered when making comparisons.

[REDACTED] Flynn then asked writer, "How many Special Agents are in the FBI?" Writer told Flynn he thought over 10,000. Flynn stated, "You have 17,000." Flynn then asked writer, "How many HVE cases does the FBI have?" Writer stated the FBI has approximately [REDACTED] HVE cases, a statistic backed up by John Mulligan, Deputy Chief of the National Counterterrorism Center. Flynn then spoke to Trump and said, "See, they don't have enough resources to work the HVE threat and the IOs." Flynn then asked writer, "Is it worse now than during the Cold War?" Writer responded that the number of identified known and suspected IOs from hostile Foreign Intelligence Services posted in the U.S. are equal to or greater than during the Cold War.

(U [REDACTED]) Following that exchange, writer continued by stating, Foreign Intelligence Services collect intelligence in three ways: HUMINT or through Human Intelligence, SIGINT or Signals Intelligence and Cyber or through computer intrusions. In the classical sense, an IO will attempt to recruit an individual to tell him or her the things he or she wants to know. This is known as HUMINT. It is highly unlikely a Foreign Intelligence Service will attempt to recruit you, however you need to be mindful of the people on your periphery: your staff, domestic help, business associates, friends, etc. Those individuals may present more vulnerabilities or be more susceptible to an approach. Those individuals will also be targeted for recruitment due to their access to you. That does not mean IOs will not make a run at you. They will send their IOs in diplomatic cover, businessperson NOCs, as well as sources they have developed around you to elicit information and gain assessment on you.

(U [REDACTED] To better explain the methodology, I will combine SIGINT and Cyber operations. Foreign Intelligence Services rely on our dependency to communicate. In this day and age to communicate effectively we must

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communicate electronically, which is a vector for exploitation by a Foreign Intelligence Service. You should be mindful of your use of landline telephones, cellular telephones, e-mail and computer networks. As you are aware, discussions regarding classified information should only be held in a facility certified for classified discussions. Therefore, a Foreign Intelligence Service would not necessarily target you technically to gain access to the classified information you were briefed on, but you will be targeted for sensitive and personal information about you.

(U/[REDACTED]) At this time, Flynn interjected, "I did SIGINT." Writer responded that he could then appreciate what our country can do technically to exploit a Tier 1 target and we must extrapolate a Foreign Intelligence Service could do the same to us. Trump then stated, "Yes I understand its a dark time. Nothing is safe on computers anymore. We used to lock things in a safe in a room, now anyone can get in. My son is ten years old. He has a computer and we put a codeword on it. Within ten minutes he broke the codeword and we needed to put another one on the computer. Kids are genius."

(U/[REDACTED]) Writer followed up by stating, in addition, you should not only consider how you communicate but where you communicate sensitive or personal information. Foreign Intelligence Services will develop a pattern on where you hold private meetings or discussions. They will attempt to determine if the location is a meeting room, kitchen, bedroom, vehicle, etc. Once a pattern is established they will attempt to exploit that location technically.

(U/[REDACTED]) Pending any questions gentlemen, that's all I have. I will also remind you the FBI is working with your transition team to provide the team with a similar counterintelligence and security brief. Thank you for your time.

[REDACTED] Following SSA Pientka's briefing the following ODNI briefers presented classified briefings on topics where they are

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subject matter experts:

[REDACTED]
National Intelligence Manager for Iran (name withheld due to cover concerns)

[REDACTED]
During the ODNI briefs, writer actively listened for topics or questions regarding the Russian Federation. During Mulligan's brief, he stated the U.S. is the world leader in Counterterrorism. Trump then asked, "Russia too?" During a discussion regarding nuclear testing, Russia and China were brought up as cheating on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Trump asked, "Who's worse?" [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Trump and Christie turned toward each other and Christie commented, "I'm shocked."

(U [REDACTED]) Due to time constraints, not all ODNI briefers presented their material. At 1750 the briefing ended to allow the candidate to meet his plane at 1900. Trump, Christie and Flynn shook hands with all presenters and exited the SCIF at approximately 1751.

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(Name of Special Agent)To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

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☐ Yes ☒ NoTitle: CROSSFIRE HURRICANEReference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☒ Original notes re interview ofOUTLINE USED DURING TRUMP BRIEF ON8/17/2016

Intro

- ✓ ^{Before} Purpose – CI and Security brief give ^{methodology} Baseline on FIS threat to US National Security.
- ✓ Advise - if not already targeting, due to this briefing and access – you are
- ✓ FIS collect Political, economic, technological and military intelligence
- ✓ Basically they want inside information to give their country a competitive advantage over US.

- ✓ FIS use Intelligence Officers as their operatives or collectors in 2 ways
- ✓ Official Cover by using IOs under diplomatic cover at US based foreign establishments
- ✓ Non official cover (NOCS) – tourists, students, academics, business people
- ✓ In the US – Russian Fed has [REDACTED] known or suspected IOs, while China has [REDACTED]
- ✓ Russian threat is more traditional – establishment based IOs, while China takes an asymmetrical approach using NOCS.

- ✓ FIS will collect intel in **3 ways** – HUMINT, SIGINT or Cyber
- ✓ **HUMINT** – IO attempt to recruit a person to provide Intel
 - Highly unlikely FIS attempt to recruit you: Staff, Business associates, domestic help
 - However – will come at you to elicit information – diplomats or NOCS
 - Classified, Sensitive, Private information
- ✓ **SIGINT & CYBER** – FIS rely on our **dependency to communicate** electronically & look to exploit.

- Mindful landline, cell calls, email, computer networks
- Mindful not only how you communicate but where
- Insider Threat – enable FIS technical penetrations

CHINA June 2015 OPM

SF-86

CLEARANCE ADJUDICATION

CUS Control/Verification SPS

3PLA

2011

INDICT 5 CHINESE

STATE TRADE SECRETS

CHINESE COMPANIES

US STEEL

Korean
NORM
TED
JUN
AMR

BURYAKOV - Russian Banker
NOC

Vneshconbank

Parabnyy - Rion
Spokystev

2.5 PARS MAY

PLA INDICTMENT ^{CYBER} INTRUSION

TIGHT BIND - Econ-Bankers

IBIS -

OPM HACK - Chinese phone/PCs
SF 86?

OCOMUS